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COMMENTS
AESTHETIC ZONING: PRESERVATION OF HISTORIC AREAS
Otez de nos coeurs cet amour du beau et vous 6tcz tout le charmze de /a vfe.'
-RoussrEwu, 1t'i:nff.
History tells us that in every civilization the affluent members of society went
to great expense to make their homes and properties as beautiful as possible.
This was true of life in the United States until the industrial revolution, when
American communities were changed substantially. Large numbers of people
were forced into crowded and highly industrialized areas. Some of the larger
communities became melting pots for people from many different nations, each
bringing with them their own concepts of architecture and of attractiveness of
construction. These concepts, as well as the need for the protection of health
and morals, were subordinated to industrialization and functionalism.- Efforts
were eventually made to improve the appearance of certain communities. But
beauty, being relative, found different expressions among different people.
During the twentieth century most communities endeavored to improve and
preserve community appearance along organized lines.3 Many cities adopted
restrictive ordinances or comprehensive zoning laws.4 Other communities made
efforts to preserve certain historic areas by enacting special legislative acts,
or by writing specific provisions into existing zoning laws.0 This comment will
discuss the attempts made by these various communities to preserve historic
areas in the light of the law as it exists today.
THE PROBLEM
That a zoning law, enacted by a municipality pursuant to state enabling
statutes, is a legitimate exercise of the police power was clearly recognized by
the Supreme Court in V1ilzge of Euclid v. .4sblcr Rcaltv Co.7 Zoning, there-
fore, finds its validity in the police power.- "But what are the police powers of
a State?"0 Chief Justice Taney described them as "nothing more or less than
1. "Take from our hearts this love of the beautiful and you take away all the charm of
life." (Editors' translation).
2. See generally 1 Aletzenbaum, Zoning 1-11 (2d ed. 1955).
3. The community's awareness of this problem becomes apparent when we dicover
litigation testing the validity of legislation based on aesthetic considerations. Such liti,ation
first began to appear in the early part of this century. Rodda, The Accomplithmcnt of
Aesthetic Purpose Under the Police Power, 27 So. Cal. L. Rev. 149 (1954). See alzo Bard,
Aesthetics and City Planning 1-9 (Citizens Union Research Foundation 1957).
4. A perusal of the comprehensive plans of numerous cities will indicate that an import-
ant, if not primary, motive of these ordinances is to preserve the beauty of the city. See,
e.g., Westport, Conn., Town Plan of Development (1959); Williamsburg, Va., Comprhcnmive
Plan (1953).
5. E.g., New Orleans, La., Vieux Carre Ordinance 1453S, March 3, 1937, as amended,
June 13, 1940.
6. Philadelphia, Pa., Zoning & Planning Code §§ 14-2c01 to -2020 (1959).
7. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See also Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp, 229 N.Y.
313, 128 N.E. 209 (1920), where the validity of comprehensive zoning legislation w~as upheld.
S. See, e.g., 420 Broad Ave. Corp. v. Borough of Palisades Park, 137 Nj.L. 527, 61 A.2d
23 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
9. License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 582 (1S47).
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the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its
dominions,"'1 limited only by the United States Constitution, particularly the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." However,
the guarantee of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not
be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real
and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.12
In reality, then, the police powers are the sum total of a state's legislative
power.
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has described the police power in
such broad terms, state courts have held that the state's police power may be
exercised only to protect and promote the safety, health, morals and general
welfare of a community.' 3 In enumerating the legitimate objectives of the
power, state courts have consistently excluded aesthetics, and have been hesi-
tant to sustain any zoning ordinance having as its sole purpose the preserva-
tion of community appearance. Although it has never ruled squarely on the
validity of aesthetic zoning, 14 the Supreme Court has suggested, in a broad
dictum, that aesthetic considerations represent a public purpose and are there-
fore a valid consideration in exercising the power of eminent domain. 16
Billboard and Sign Restrictions
The most common cases touching upon the matter of aesthetics were those
involving signs and billboards. Typical of the judicial reaction to legislation
curtailing such signs was City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting Co.,10 which
held that an ordinance forbidding the construction of billboards within ten
feet of the street could not be justified as an exercise of the police power.
The court said:
no case has been cited, nor are we aware of any case which holds that a man may be
deprived of his property because his tastes are not those of his neighbors. Aesthetic con-
siderations are a matter of luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity, and it is
necessity alone which justifies the exercise of the police power to take private property
without compensation.' 7
It was on this type of reasoning that many of the earlier restrictions were
struck down.' 8
10. Ibid.
11. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
12. Id. at 525.
13. Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 137 N.J.L. 81, 58 A.2d 104
(Sup. Ct. 1948), rev'd, 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949) ; 420 Broad Ave. Corp. v. Borough of
Palisades Park, 137 N.J.L. 527, 61 A.2d 23 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
14. See Incorporated Village of Brookville v. Paulgene Realty Corp., 24 Misc. 2d 790,
200 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1960). See also Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass. 597, 127
N.E. 525 (1920).
15. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
16. 72 N.J.L. 285, 62 AtI. 267 (Ct. Err. & App. 1905).
17. Id. at 287, 62 AtI. at 268.
18. E.g., Varney & Greene v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318, 100 Pac. 867 (1909); City of
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A change in judicial thinking was certain to come if only because of the
sprawling growth of billboard advertising. Later cases, sustaining legislative
restrictions on billboards and other highway advertising, found the municipal-
ities to be protecting the safety, health, and morals, or promoting the general
welfare of the citizens.1 Billboards were declared a source of danger because
they were poorly constructed or because they obscured the automobile driver's
vision, or declared a menace to public morals because they provided a con-
cealed place for the commission of immoral and criminal acts, or branded a
threat to public health because the area behind the billboard became a dump-
ing or collecting ground for debris 20 In no case, however, did any court go so
far as to sustain billboard zoning or billboard restrictions on the theory that
they were objectionable purely because they constituted an eyesore.21
In several cases the matter of aesthetics, though not controlling, was found
pertinent, but was to be considered only in conjunction with other factors.2
The New York Court of Appeals put this reasoning in rather lyrical language:
Beauty may not be queen but she is not an outcast beyond the pale of protection or
respect. She may at least shelter herself under the wing of safety, morality or deccncy.23
In the famous M.assachusetts Billboard Cases,2-1 the court went further and
said that if no other grounds existed to sustain an ordinance restricting outdoor
advertising, it could be upheld on aesthetic grounds alone.25 There is language
in other cases which indicates that some courts might look more favorably upon
aesthetic considerations. 2 Moreover, the President of the United States re-
cently called upon the Congress for further legislation on the matter of bill-
board control.2 7 The President's message was in the nature of a plea to
preserve the natural beauty of the country.2 s
Chicago v. Gunning Sys., 214 Ill. 623, 73 N.E. 1035 (1905); People ax rel. 2. Wineburgh
Advertising Co. v. Murphy, 195 N.7. 126, SS N.E. 17 (1909).
19. Comment, 35 M arq. L. Rev. 365 (1952).
20. Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944).
21. Incorporated Village of Brookville v. Paulgene Realty Corp., 24 Mizc. 2d 790, 2 0
N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
22. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of IndianapolL, 202 Ind. 35, 172 N.E. 3G9
(1930). Accord, Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A2d 177 (1944);
Perlmutter v. Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 132 N.E. 5 (1932).
23. Perlmutter v. Greene, supra note 22, at 327, 182 N.E. at 6.
24. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Worls, 2S9 M'a. 149, 193
N.E. 799 (1935).
25. Id at 187, 193 N.E. at 316. Accord, Preferred Tires, Inc. v. Village of Hemp:tead,
173 Misc. 1017, 19 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
26. See, e.g., Town of Lexington v. Govenar, 295 Mass. 31, 3 N.E2d 19 (1936); Com-
monwealth v. Trimmer, 34 Munic. Law Rep. 37 (Pa. 1942).
27. N.Y. Times, March 1, 1961, p. 16, coL S. President Kennedy urged that § 122 of the
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 9C0, 23 U.S.C. § 122 (1958), be amended and
then extended past its June 1961 expiration date. This scction in effect providca incentive
payments to various states complying with federal billboard control policy.
28. N.Y7. Times, supra note 27.
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Other Restrictions
While the billboard regulations have in many instances provided the test
cases for restrictions based on aesthetic considerations, they are but a small
part of a comprehensive zoning plan to beautify the community. With an eye
on aesthetics, many communities have passed ordinances providing for minimum
floor space requirements, 20 minimum cubic foot requirements, ° and maximum
height of buildings. 31 Frequently, ordinances require that buildings be set
back a certain number of feet from the street line.32 Some comprehensive zon-
ing plans have prohibited the building of apartment houses in certain areas, 3
while others have set up separate zones for two family dwellings and single
residences.3 4 Most cities refuse to permit commercial buildings in specified
residential areas,35 while many others prohibit businesses from all but one or
a few districts. 36 Several communities have even passed ordinances prohibiting
the removal of topsoil.37 In all of the enumerated instances, the ordinances met
the test of a "public welfare" purpose.
More recently, several communities enacted ordinances which at first glance
would appear to stand on aesthetic considerations or not stand at all. In City
of West Palm Beach v. State ex rel. Duffey,3a the ordinance provided that in
every new instance the completed appearance of every new building or structure
must substantially equal that of the adjacent building or structures in the
subdivision in appearance, square foot area and height.39 The court held the
29. In Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952),
appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953), the court held such regulation valid and spoke
favorably of aesthetic considerations.
30. In Elizabeth Lake Estates v. Waterford Township, 317 Mich. 359, 26 N.W.2d 788
(1947), the court held that the ordinance could not be sustained as a valid exercise of the
police power, stating that its sole purpose was to preserve property values and that it was
not reasonably related to the protection and promotion of public health and safety. The
court assumed, of course, that "the conservation of property values is not by Itself made a
proper sole objective for the exercise of the police power under the statute." Id at 369, 26
N.W.2d at 792. But see State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis.
262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955).
31. Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909), where the statute limiting the height of
buildings was held valid as a legitimate exercise of the police power in protecting the health
and safety of the public. See also Brougher v. Board of Pub. Works, 107 Cal. App. 15, 290
Pac. 140 (Dist. Ct. App. 1930). But see 122 Main St. Corp. v. City of Brockton, 323 Mass.
646, 84 N.E.2d 13 (1949).
32. E.g., Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927), where the ordinance was upheld because
it promoted public safety and health.
33. E.g., Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120 (1925).
34. E.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
35. E.g., Ware v. City of Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99 (1923).
36. E.g., Delmar v. Town of Milford, 19 Conn. Supp. 21, 109 A.2d 604 (C.P. 1954).
The court upheld the zoning board's refusal to grant petitioner an application to run an
automobile junkyard in a well cared for, heavily industrialized zone.
37. E.g., Krantz v. Town of Amherst, 192 Misc. 912, 80 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
38. 158 Fla. 863, 30 So. 2d 491 (1947).
39. Id at 864, 30 So. 2d at 492.
ordinance an unreasonable exercise of the police power and invalid for the
further reason that it did not set sufficiently definite standards. In State c- rMl.
Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland4 0 however, a Wisconsin court found
a similar ordinance4 ' valid, stating:
the protection of property values is an objective which falls within the exercie of the
police powers to promote the "general welfare," and . . . it is immaterial v:hether the
ordinance is grounded solely upon such objective or that such purpose is but one of
several legitimate objectives. '
The reasoning in lWieland has been followed, the regulations being generally
sustained as a legitimate exercise of the police power serving to protect the
market value of property.4
3
PRESENT STATUS OF THE LAW
The Supreme Court has, as noted, defined the police power of a state as the
sum total of the state's legislative powers exercised within the constitutional
limits of due process of law.44 Under the Court's definition, a municipal zoning
ordinance would be valid if it is not "unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious,"
and if the means selected to carry it into effect "have a real and substantial
relation to the object sought to be attained."-15 There appears to be no valid
reason why a zoning ordinance based solely on aesthetic considerations could
not satisfy the test of reasonableness.
Yet the question may well be academic because any zoning ordinance pro-
tecting the aesthetic appearance of the community necessarily protects the
market value of the properties affected. Such statutes need not seek their
justification in aesthetics alone. They can be sustained for economic reasons, °
and no one would question the right of the state to protect the economy of its
communities. There may be a necessary nexus between aesthetic considerations
40. 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955).
41. The ordinance required that before a building permit could be issued, the village
building board would have to find that the architectural appeal and functional plan of the
proposed structure would not be so at variance with those of the other structurca in the
immediate neighborhood as to cause substantial depredation of property value3. Id at
271, 69 N.W.2d at 222.
42. Id at 270, 69 N.W.2d at 222. The court in Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 203, 293,
150 N.E. 120, 122 (1925), stated that "the [police] power is not limited to regulations
designed to promote public health, public morals or public safety or to the Eupprcc=ion
of what is offensive, disorderly or unsanitary but extends to so dealing with conditions
which exist as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public
convenience or general prosperity." See also Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (IC07); State
ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923); Ayer v. Cram, 242
lass. 30, 136 N.E. 3S3 (1922); City of St. Louis v. Friedman, 216 S.W.2d 475 (,fo.
194S); Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Towmship, 10 NJ. 165, S9 A.2d 693 (1952);
Niday v. City of Bellaire, 251 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Cir. App. 1952).
43. Comment, 39 Mlarq. L. Rev. 135 (1955).
44. See notes 9-12 supra.
45. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
46. See cases cited in note 42 supra.
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and economic considerations. That this may be true is best illustrated by the
many instances of zoning laws enacted for the purpose of preserving historic
sites. To preserve or restore historic areas is to restore or preserve the appear-
ance of the community. When historic areas are restored, there is also a double
economic gain. Property values within the area itself and in surrounding areas
are protected and increased; and in addition, the community's economy is
augmented by the attraction of tourist trade. There have been many interesting
instances of such zoning in recent years.
ZONING OF HIsToc AREAS
New Orleans
The City of New Orleans, Louisiana, located bn the Mississippi River, 107
miles from the river's mouth,47 was founded, circa 1718, by the French, and
ceded to Spain in 1762.48 Because its heritage is so steeped in French and
Spanish tradition, New Orleans, in many respects, resembles more a continental
European city than a typical city in the United States. For this reason it has
become one of the great tourist meccas.40
The focal point of tourist interest in the city is the French quarter, 0 the
Vieux Carre. 51 As the first step in an effort to preserve "the architectural and
historical value" of this section, a provision of the state constitution was pro-
posed and ratified by popular referendum in 1936.52 This provision gave the
Commission Council of the City of New Orleans the authority to create the
Vieux Carre Commission for the purpose of preserving
such buildings in the Vieux Carre section of the City of New Orleans as, in the opinion
of said Commission, shall be deemed to have architectural and historical value, and
which buildings should be preserved for the benefit of the people of the City of New
Orleans and the State of Louisiana .... 53
The provision also declared that preservation of buildings in the section was a
public purpose and authorized the City of New Orleans to acquire land by
eminent domain to effect that purpose.5 4 The amendment expressly recited that
the commission would function "for the public welfare in order that the quaint
and distinctive character of the Vieux Carre section ... may not be seriously
affected . . ."55 A "public welfare" recital is quite common in statutes and
47. 16 Encyclopedia Brittanica 321 (1954).
48. Id at 323.
49. Louisiana was one of the first states to enact a statute authorizing comprehensive
zoning. The zoning ordinance of New Orleans, enacted under this statute, was upheld In
State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923).
50. 16 Encyclopedia Brittanica 321 (1954).
51. New Orleans, La., Vieux Carre Ordinance 14538, § 2, March 3, 1957, defines the
physical boundaries of this section.
52. Letter from New Orleans, La., City Planner to Fordham Law Review, March 1,
1961.





ordinances designed to preserve historic areasY0 Apparently, it is done to avoid
judicial scrutiny.
The Commission Council of the City of New Orleans in turn adopted the
Vieux Carre Ordinance, 7 creating the nine member Vieux Carre Commission.
The ordinance required issuance of a permit "before the commencement of any
work in the erection of any new building, or repairing or demolishing of any
existing building, any portion of which is to front on any public street or
alley in the Vieux Carre . . S The application for the permit has to be
accompanied by the full plans and specifications of the exterior "so far as they
relate to the proposed appearance, color, texture or materials and architectural
design. .. ." The commission is required to make its findings and recom-
mendations and send the same to the City Engineer who is empowered to decide
whether or not a permit should issue." The City Engineer and any authorized
agent or officer of the commission have the authority to halt any work attempted
to be done without or in violation of the permit and they have the power to
prosecute those who violate the ordinance.0 '
The ordinance further provides that no sign shall be erected in the Vieux
Carre without a permitY Subsequent sections state that signs must be for
bona fide businesses; C3 must not project more than a certain number of inches;cl
must not have more than a prescribed area; 5 and must not be placed "in any
manner whatsoever so as to disfigure or conceal any architectural features or
details of any building.""6
56. E.g., Mass. Acts & Resolves 1955, ch. 601.
57. New Orleans, La., Vieux Carre Ordinance 14533, March 3, 1937, as amcnded by
Ordinance 150S5, June 13, 1940.
53. New Orleans, La., Vieux Carre Ordinance 14533, March 3, 1937, as amcndcd by
Ordinance 50SS, § 3, June 13, 1940.
59. Ibid.
60. If the applicant refuses to accede to the changes rccommended by the commiscIon,
or if the commission disapproves of any application, or if the commion's recommenda-
tions are not in accord with the ordinance, the City Enginccr fhall forward the applica-
tion to the Commission Council of New Orleans for a full hearing of all interested partie3.
Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. New Orleans, La., Vieux Carre Ordinance 14533, March 3, 1937, as amended by
Ordinance 15OSS, § 6, June 13, 1940. This section does not apply to theaters changkng the
features on already approved frames or to commercial establishments changing their wares
and prices on previously approved signs.
63. New Orleans, La., Vieux Carre Ordinance 14538, March 3, 1937, as amendcd by
Ordinance 15035, § 7, June 13, 1940.
64. New Orleans, La., Vieux Carre Ordinance 14533, March 3, 1937, as amended by
Ordinance 150SS, § 9, June 13, 1940.
65. New Orleans, La., Vieux Carre Ordinance 14533, Iarch 3, 1937, as amendcd by
Ordinance 15035, § 10, June 13, 1940.
66. New Orleans, La., Vieux Care Ordinance 14533, March 3, 1937, as amcnded by




Several cases have sustained the Vieux Carre Ordinance, but particularly
noteworthy was City of New Orleans v. Levy,0 7 which said:
Perhaps esthetic considerations alone would not warrant an imposition of the several
restrictions contained in Vieux Carre Commission Ordinance. But, as pointed out in the
Pergament case, this legislation is in the interest of and beneficial to inhabitants of New
Orleans generally, the preserving of the Vieux Carre section being not only for its senti-
mental value but also for its commercial value, and hence it constitutes a valid exercise
of the police power. 68
The Louisiana court has not attempted to base its decisions on aesthetic con-
siderations but has relied on solidly established economic grounds.
Nantucket
The island of Nantucket, located off the coast of Cape Cod, Massachusetts,
has a year round population of approximately 4,000 persons but attracts over
125,000 visitors in the months of June, July, August and September. 0
It is a town which largely needs no restoration; an island world serving as a perfect
example of how its 18th and 19th century forebears lived in their day in the "Maritime
Worlds" of our country .... 70
Most of the businesses in the town are conducted by residents either from their
homes or from shops in the rear of their property. 1 Nantucket has never had
a zoning ordinance. 72 However, in 1955, in order to guarantee the preserva-
tion of Nantucket's antiquity, the Massachusetts Legislature passed an act
"establishing an historic districts commission . . . defining its powers and duties,
and establishing historic districts in the Town of Nantucket."7 In February
1956, the act was unanimously accepted by the voters of the town.7 4 The
Massachusetts act is similar to the provision in the Louisiana Constitution 7 in
that there is a recital that the "act is to promote the general welfare." 70 But
unlike the Louisiana enactment, it states that the public welfare of Nantucket
depends to a large extent on the tourist trade.77
At the present time, no building or structure can be "erected, reconstructed,
altered, restored 78 or razed"7 9 until an application for a permit to do so is
67. 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953). See also City of Now Orleans v. Impastato, 198 La.
206, 3 So. 2d 559 (1941); City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129
(1941).
68. 223 La. at 28-29, 64 So. 2d at 802-03 (1953).
69. Nantucket, Mass., Historic Dists. Comm'n Rep. (1958).
70. Ibid.
71. Historic Districts Commission Memorandum re Establishing the Nantucket Historic
Districts Commission (undated post 1957 memorandum).
72. Ibid. Nantucket is similarly void of a building code.
73. Mass. Acts & Resolves 1955, ch. 601.
74. Nantucket, Mass., Historic Dists. Comm'n Rep. (1960).
75. La. Const. art. 14, § 22A.
76. Mass. Acts & Resolves 1955, ch. 601, § 1.
77. Ibid.
78. Mass. Acts & Resolves 1955, ch. 601, § 4.
79. Mass. Acts & Resolves 1955, ch. 601, § 5.
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approved by the Historic Districts Commission. The commission has the
function and duty "to pass upon the appropriateness of exterior architectural
features of buildings and structures . . . wherever such exterior features are
subject to public xiew from a public street or way."''  However, unlike the
New Orleans ordinance, the legislature has expressly declared that the com-
mission cannot consider the relative size of buildings, detailed designs, interior
arrangement, nor any feature of a structure not subject to public view. 1 A
person violating the act is guilty of a misdemeanor,"- but has leave to appeal
to the board of selectmen,- 3 and eventually "to the superior court sitting in
equity. ' ' s4
The constitutionality of this statute has never been in doubt. Immediately
before its enactment the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts, in an advisory opinion given to the legislature, found the proposed
statute constitutional.-5 The court noted that the act contained sufficient
standards, was limited to exterior features, and was necessary to insure that
Nantucket will continue to exist as an attraction for tourists.
Soon after the Nantucket act was passed, the legislature enacted special acts
for the Beacon Hill section of Boston, Lexington. Falmouth, Salem, Concord
and other cities and towns in the Commonwealth. '6 In 1960, however, the
legislature passed a state enabling act, 7 authorizing any municipality to adopt
historic district ordinances without the need of special legislative permission.
The enabling act provides that in passing upon the issue of appropriateness,
the commissions shall consider the relation of the proposed exterior features
to similar features of buildings and structures in the immediate surroundings,
a provision not found in the Nantucket statute."
IVilliamsburg
The project undertaken in Williamsburg, Virginia, differs from that under-
taken in other municipalities in two important aspects: it was a restoration
project rather than one of preservation, and the restoration was conducted by
private groups rather than by the municipality.
Eighteenth century "colonial Williamsburg" has been accurately restored,
mainly, if not entirely, through the gifts of John D. Rockefeller, Jr. 9 The
S0. MNass. Acts & Resolves 1955, ch. 601, § Sa. Section 6 of the act regulates the
erection of occupational signs.
S1. Mlass. Acts & Resolves 1955, ch. 601, § Sc.
82. Alass. Acts & Resolves 1955, ch. 601, § 9.
83. Mlass. Acts & Resolves 1955, ch. 601, § 10.
84. lass. Acts & Resolves 1955, ch. 601, § 11.
S5. Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 773, 12S N.E.2d 557 (1955).
S6. Nantucket, Mass., Historic Dists. Comm'n Rep. (19L0).
87. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 40C (1961).
83. MNass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 40C § 6 (1961). It is interesting to note that a 6unilar
provision was declared invalid by the Florida court in City of Wezt Palm Beach v. State
ex rel. Duffey, 158 Fla. 863, 30 So. 2d 491 (1947), but upheld by the Wcicomin court in
State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W2d 217 (1955).
89. Mr. Rockefeller through gifts and trusts donated some forty-eight million dollars to
the restoration project. Colonial Williamsburg, President's Rep. 24 (1951).
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acquisition was made either in the name of a private individual or in the name
of the Williamsburg Holding Corporation. 0 At the present time, all the land
so purchased as part of the historical area is held by a nonprofit corporation,
Colonial Williamsburg, Inc.91 Williamsburg Restoration, Inc., a profit-making
corporation, owns and operates or leases certain properties adjacent to the
historic area.92 These properties are used, in most instances, to accommodate
the many tourists who visit Williamsburg each year to see the restored area.
Both of these corporations pay real estate and business license taxes to the
City of Williamsburg, and the business corporation is taxed like any other
business enterprise.9 3 Many of the buildings were completely rebuilt or re-
stored to their original form through major alteration. Historical accuracy has
been achieved so that at the present time "Colonial Williamsburg" represents,
as far as possible, an exact replica of the eighteenth century city.
The restored area represents approximately eight and one half per cent of
the total area of the City of Williamsburg.94 As privately owned land, it is
subject to the zoning provisions of Williamsburgp and as such it is one of the
eight zoning districts within the city.95 Since 1953, the City of Williamsburg
has had a comprehensive city plan which was prepared by independent city
planners.96 A considerable portion of the plan is concerned with the city's
appearance and deals with such aesthetic considerations as the planting of
street trees, 97 the removal of overhead poles and wires, 98 street appurtenances,0 9
the entrances to the city,100 and the appearance of residential,' 0 ' commercial10 2
and recreational areas.' 0 3 As to some of these projects, work has been done; 10 4
but as to many of the others, the plans are "long range."' 0 5
Other Cities
As of 1958 there were only twenty cities and towns in the United States and
its possessions that regulated historic areas.10 6 However, since that time, at least
90. Ibid.
91. Colonial Williamsburg, President's Rep. (1959).
92. Ibid.
93. Id. at 47.
94. City of Williamsburg, Va., Zoning Map.
95. Ibid.
96. Letter from Chairman of Planning Commission to the Mayor and City Council,
Sept. 1, 1953, in City of Williamsburg, Va., Comprehensive Plan (1953).
97. City of Williamsburg, Va., Comprehensive Plan 127-28 (1953) [hereinafter cited as
Comprehensive Plan].
98. Comprehensive Plan 128.
99. Comprehensive Plan 129.
100. Comprehensive Plan 133.
101. Comprehensive Plan 130-32.
102. Comprehensive Plan 133-34.
103. Comprehensive Plan 132-33.
104. E.g., as part of the restoration program, the poles and wires were removed from
one street and placed underground, at a cost of $520,000. Comprehensive Plan 128-29.
105. Comprehensive Plan 127-28.
106. Nantucket, Mass., Historic Dists. Comm'n Rep. (1958).
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five municipalities in Massachusetts alone have enacted such regulations.167
Philadelphia has adopted a code provision "to preserve the historical char-
acter of the Independence Hall Structures, Independence Hall, and Independ-
ence National Historic Park. .. ."10 In addition, the Philadelphia Code con-
tains a more general provision creating a "historical commission," the function
of which is to assist the Department of Public Property in preparing a list of
buildings with historical significance which cannot be demolished or altered
without a license from the appropriate department '(9 It should be noted that
the Philadelphia ordinance differs from that of Nantucket and New Orleans in
that it does not create a historic district but merely endeavors to preserve cer-
tain buildings of historical value.
Los Angeles has also sought to preserve its historic centers. In an effort to
preserve "the birthplace of Los Angeles" with its Spanish flavor, the Pueblo
de Los Angeles State Historical Monument was established.110 The creation of
this district came about largely through the efforts of individual citizens and a
nonprofit corporation which promoted the idea. As a result, California appro-
priated a sum of money, which was matched by the city and county combined,
to create a state historical monument."' The monument includes numerous
historical buildings and an entire street."-'
The Beacon Hill District in the City of Boston was established in an effort
to preserve some of the tradition of one of the oldest cities in the United
States.1 3 The procedural requirements of the Boston act are similar to those
of the Nantucket act."" Unlike Nantucket, however, Boston has a zoning code
and originally there was some question as to whether the preservation should
be done through the code. It appears that the decision to proceed through a
special act of the legislature was due, to a large extent, to the uncertainty of
the law as to the validity of "aesthetic zoning."" 5u As part of its urban re-
newal program, Boston is also considering the possibility of preserving other
areas, such as its "Back Bay," but some questions remain as to whether these
areas can be considered historic. 10
107. Nantucket, Mass., Historic Dists. Comm'n Rep. (1960).
log. Philadelphia, Pa., Zoning and Planning Code § 14-2c05 (1959).
10g. Philadelphia, Pa., Zoning and Planning Code § 14-2cL3 (1959).
110. Letter from Los Angeles, Cal., City Planning Architcct to the Fordham Law
Review, March 15, 1961.
111. Los Angeles, Cal., Accomplishments of City Planning CommiLon 6 (1954).
112. Before the creation of this historic district, it was held in Simpson v. City of Lo3
Angeles, 4 CaL 2d 60, 47 P.2d 474 (1935), that a city ordinance which clo:cd Olvera
Street to vehicular traffic in order to convert it into a tourLt attraction was valid. The
court, in sustaining the ordinance, refused to look at its purpose, thereby rcvcring a lower
court decision which held the ordinance invalid because its actual purpo:z vas acthctic.
113. Mass. Acts & Resolves 1955, ch. 616, as amended by Acts & Rcolves 19-5, chs.
314-15.
114. Mass. Acts & Resolves, 1955, ch. 601.
113. Letter from Director of Planning of Boston Redevelopment Authority to Mayor's
Office, Boston, Mass., Feb. 23, 1961.
116. Ibid.
